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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law—Civil Aeronautics Act—Supersession pro tanto
of the Antitrust Laws.—Pan American World Airways v. United
States.1—The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, upon request
of the-
 Civil Aeronautics Board, commenced a suit in a federal district court
against Pan American, an air carrier, W. R. Grace & Co., a steamship carrier,
and Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra), their jointly owned air carrier,
charging them with violations of Sections 1, 2,and 3 of the Sherman Act.2
The Government alleged that Pan American and Grace by agreement had
allocated routes and divided territories between Pan American and Panagra
and that Pan American, by use of its fifty per cent control over Panagra,
prevented the latter from extending its operations into the United States.
The court found Pan American's use of its stock veto power over Panagra's
route extension a violation of section 2 and ordered it to show cause why it
should not be directed to divest itself of the stock. The complaint against
Grace and Panagra was dismissed. Both the Government and Pan American
appealed to the Supreme Courts HELD: All questions of injunctive relief
against territorial divisions, route allocations and affiliations between common
and air carriers lie solely within the purview of the CAB, and therefore the
antitrust complaint should have been dismissed.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the Court
should have applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction rather than finding
a pro tanto repeal of the antitrust laws. Since primary jurisdiction' is the
usual method of accommodation of the antitrust and regulatory laws, the
doctrine should be examined in order to determine whether the Court's
decision, in the words of Mr. Justice Brennan, "works an extraordinary and
unwarranted departure from the settled principles by which the antitrust
and regulatory regimes of law are accommodated to each other." 3
1
 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
2
 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1958).
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal. . • .
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor. • . .
§ 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the
District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State
or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby declared
illegal.
3 For a more complete statement of the facts and an analysis of the decision of the
District Court, see Note, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 107-13 (1961).
4 Also known as preliminary jurisdiction, exclusive primary jurisdiction and pre-
liminary resort.
5 371 U.S. at 319.
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To many legal commentators and treatise writers, primary jurisdiction
is merely a procedural device whereby the administrative agency is per-
mitted to act upon the suit prior to a judicial decision. Foremost among
these is Professor Kenneth Davis, who writes that "the function of the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction is merely to determine which tribunal shall make
the initial decision and not which shall make the final decision. . . ."° Those
who follow this view hold that the term establishes a time-table for two pro-
ceedings and no more. Thus, the application of the doctrine would not pre-
clude a later antitrust suit brought in the courts. This is the meaning Mr.
Justice Brennan gives primary jurisdiction when he criticizes the Court for
not applying the doctrine in Pan American.
On the other hand, many writers have taken the position that primary
jurisdiction means more than preliminary resort to the administrative agency.
One writes, "The recent expansion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine .. .
[has converted] it from a choice of forum rule to a substantive, judge-made
exemption from the competitive dictates of the antitrust laws. . "7 An-
other states, "It [primary jurisdiction] does much more than prescribe the
mere procedural time table of the lawsuit. It is a doctrine allocating the
law-making power over certain aspects of the carrier-shipper relation."
And .a third, "Although frequently invoked to regulate the' order of agency
and judicial decision, the doctrine is not merely jurisdictional. After an
agency has taken jurisdiction and acted, its ruling may be held to deprive a
court of power to entertain a suit altogether, even though the agency is not
given power under a statutory exempting clause to immunize from suit."
Several cases applying the doctrine indicate that the latter position is the
stronger.
The Court in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwest Ry.," a case wherein the
plaintiff sought damages for antitrust violations, held that the remedy for
damages under the Sherman Act had been superseded by the reparative
remedy provided in the Interstate Commerce Act. 1 ' In S.S.W., Inc. v. Air
Transp. Ass'n 12 the court held that to the extent that various practices,
methods of competition, combinations, etc. are determined by the CAB to
be permissible under the Civil Aeronautics Act (CAA), no injunctive relief
is available under the antitrust laws. However, the antitrust laws do remain
in effect to the extent that they provide a remedy which the CAB may not
render and to the extent that they cover subject matter outside the scope of
the jurisdiction of the CAB. Thus, as pointed out in Slick Airways, Inc. v.
0 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 19.01, at 4-5 (1958).
7 Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abuse
of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436, 466 (1954).
8
 Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 577, 583-84 (1954).
9 Note, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers: The Opposing Views of the Federal
Banking Agencies and the Department of Justice, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 756, 761 (1962).
10 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
11 See also United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932),
which held that the antitrust laws were superseded to the extent that a remedy was
provided by the Shipping Act.
12 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952).
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American Airlines, Inc., 13
 the plaintiff could seek treble damages under the
antitrust laws because there was no provision for them in the CAA and
damages could be had only by resort to the courts."
From the above cases the following principle may be extracted: if the
subject matter of the suit is covered by the regulatory act and if the regula-
tory agency can award complete relief, the antitrust laws are pro tanto
superseded. The only function of the courts will be a review of the agency's
action to insure that the standards set out in the regulatory act were ob-
served by the agency."' However, if the agency cannot render complete re-
lief, the aggrieved party alleging antitrust violations may seek relief from
the courts, 16
 but only after a prior resort is made to the regulatory agency.
Such prior resort is necessary because of the need for uniformity of regula-
tion and because the facts may involve complicated technicalities which re-
quire the expertise of the agency's members. 17
 Therefore, it is submitted that
the meaning given primary jurisdiction by Mr. Justice Brennan is too nar-
row and that the term should encompass pro tanto supersession of the anti-
trust laws.
An examination of the instant case indicates that it falls within the ex-
panded meaning of primary jurisdiction and therefore was correctly dis-
missed by the Court. First, the CAB has jurisdiction over the methods of
13
 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), petition for prohibition dismissed sub nom.
American Airlines v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. American Air-
lines v. Slick Airways, inc., 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
14
 The court also held that the Canard decision, see supra note 11, was inapplicable
because no supersession of the antitrust laws is contained in the CAA.
15
 Review of foreign route awards is made by the President rather than the judiciary
because of considerations of foreign and military policy. Sec case cited by the Pan
American Court, Chicago & So. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
16
 The CAA contains the saving clause, "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 1027, as amended, Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 798, 49 U.S.C. § 1506
(1958). However, such saving clauses in regulatory acts do not prevent the application
of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. For example, see the fountainhead of the doctrine,
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), where the Court
held that the saving clause in the Interstate Commerce Act could not destroy the act
itself. See also Slick Airways v. American Airlines, supra note 13, at 107 F. Supp. 207,
where it was stated that the saving clause in the CAA "is not to be construed, however,
as vitiating the primary jurisdiction rule whenever applicable."
17 Mr. Justice Frankfurter has cogently expressed the desirability of giving the
agency an opportunity to apply its expert knowledge to the facts:
Mil cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges
or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by
Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so
even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence
serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity
and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency
are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than
courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more
flexible procedure.
Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
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competition employed in the aeronautics industry. Section 411 of the CAA
provides:
The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint... ,
if it considers that such action by it would be in the interest of the
public, investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign
air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in . . . unfair
methods of competition. . . . If the Board shall find, after notice
and hearing, that such ... carrier . . . or . . . agent is engaged
in such . . . unfair methods of competition, it shall order [it] „ .
to cease and desist from such ... methods of competition." (Em-
phasis supplied.)
The CAB's jurisdiction is clearly not defeated by the fact that Pan American
and Grace formed Panagra and entered into the route allocation and terri-
torial division agreement prior to the enactment of the CAA. The words
"has been or is engaged" are sufficient to include practices presently being
carried out, regardless of when they began. As pointed out by the Court,
the Sherman Act was applied to combinations formed •before 1890. 19 Fur-
thermore, the CAB has the duty to establish "Competition to the extent
necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense." 29 The
acts charged by the Government as antitrust violations are methods of com-
petition, thus they fall within the jurisdiction of the CAB.
Second, a complete remedy for the Government will be an order direct-
ing Pan American and Grace to cease and desist from the further practice of
route allocation and territorial division and Pan American to divest itself of
its Panagra stock. As seen from the preceding paragraph, the CAB can issue
such orders to halt unfair methods of competition. However, since Grace is
neither an air carrier nor a ticket agent, it is very probable that the CAB
does not have jurisdiction over it under section 411. Nevertheless, an order
directed to Pan American and Panagra would accomplish the desired result.21
In addition, although the CAA does not expressly grant the CAB the power
to order stock divestiture, such can be logically inferred therefrom. Thus,
the Court, after noting that the CAB had no power to award damages or to
bring criminal prosecutions and did not have jurisdiction over every anti-
trust violation by air carriers, stated: "But where the problem lies within
the purview of the Board, as do questions of division of territories, the al-
location of routes, and the affiliation of common carriers with air carriers,
Congress must have intended to give it authority that was ample to deal
with the evil at hand."22 In Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States,23
18 52 Stat. 1003 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1958).
12
 The Court cited United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897), in support of this observation.
20 52 Stat. 980 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1958).
21 Mr. Justice Brennan's fears that the CAB could not proceed against Pan
American unless it could also proceed against Grace appear to be without merit.
22 Pan American World Airways v. United States, supra note 1, at 312.
22 371 U.S. 115 (1962).
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cited by the Court in a footnote, it was held that the ICC had the power to
compel divestiture even though such was not expressly granted by the Inter-
state Commerce Act. "The justification for the remedy is the removal of the
violation."24
Consequently, the acts charged as antitrust violations are within the
jurisdiction of the CAB and that agency can grant a complete remedy.
Therefore, in accordance with the primary jurisdiction principle formulated
above, the CAB has sole jurisdiction over the matter and the antitrust laws
are to that extent superseded. The Court thus has followed the proper
course of action in dismissing the antitrust suit.
It is a well known canon of construction that repeals by implication are
not favored. Yet, when the circumstances are similar to those presented in
Pan American, the courts should be willing to find that all but review juris-
diction has been ceded to the regulatory body. The two regimes of law
would surely collide if after the CAB found that the practices of the parties
were in the public interest, the courts could find that they were violations of
the antitrust laws. Uniformity of regulation would thereby have suffered
greatly. We have not yet reached the point where all actions involving reg-
ulated industries must be brought before a regulatory agency, 25 although
some may view Pan American as a step in that direction. Illustrative is the
statement of the attorneys for the reclusive Mr. Howard Hughes that "the
CAB, rather than the courts, should settle disputes involving control of air-
lines."2° Finally, although the Court attempted to limit its decision to the
"narrow questions" presented in the case, it may have cast doubt upon the
applicability of the antitrust laws to any situation involving airlines. If that
be so, a more definitive statement of the inter-relationship of the antitrust
laws and the Civil Aeronautics Act will be required in subsequent cases.
CHARLES BRADFORD ABBOTT
Antitrust—Clayton Act—Section 4B—Statute of Limitations—Doc-
trine of Fraudulent Concealment.—Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac.
Elec. Co. 1—in February 1962 the plaintiff brought two treble damage suits
against the defendant electric companies under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.2 The defendants were alleged to have been implicated in a conspiracy
to fix the prices of certain items of electrical equipment. The plaintiff as-
24
 Id. at 130.
25 It has been suggested that we may be approaching that point. See Schwartz,
supra note 7, at 469-70.
26 Newsweek, February 25, 1963, pp. 79-80.
1 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. Week 3283 (U.S.
Feb. 28, 1963) (No. 881).
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
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